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COMMENTS 
 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE LONG ROAD  
TO LEGITIMACY BEGINS WITH  
THE TRIAL OF THOMAS  
LUBANGA DYILO 
 
Sara Anoushirvani 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of establishing an effective independent 
international criminal court has been in the making for decades.  
Since the end of World War I in 1919, the international 
community has made significant efforts to establish a permanent 
international criminal court.1  The United Nations (―UN‖) in 
particular has been instrumental in seeking to establish this type 
of Tribunal.  The UN General Assembly‘s passing of Resolution 
260 on December 9, 1948, which adopted the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (―Genocide 
Convention‖), paved the way for the establishment of a 
permanent Tribunal.2  Resolution 260 further ―invited the 
International Law Commission ‗to study the desirability and 
possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the 
trial of persons charged with genocide.‘‖3  Almost fifty years later, 
 
 1 BASSIOUNI, M. CHERIF, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC STATUTE 45 
(2005). 
 2 Article IV of the Genocide Convention provides, in pertinent part, that 
persons charged with genocide "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the 
State in the territory of which the act was committed or by such international 
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction . . . ." United Nations Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. VI, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
 3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Overview, http:// 
untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (citing 
1
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the goal of establishing an international criminal court was 
attained after the General Assembly convened the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, in Rome, Italy, from June 15 
to July 17, 1998.4 
The international community praised the creation of an 
independent and permanent international criminal court.5  Then 
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, commented that ―[i]n the 
prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of 
universal justice.  That is the simple and soaring hope of this 
vision.‖6  The International Criminal Court (―ICC‖) was created 
with the aspirations to achieve justice for all, end impunity, help 
end conflicts, remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals, take 
over when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or 
unable to act, and deter future war criminals.7  Moreover, ―[a]n 
international criminal court has been called the missing link in 
the international legal system.‖8  The Preamble to the Rome 
Statute further elaborates on the purposes and goals of the ICC 
by noting that crimes against humanity threaten the peace, 
security and well-being of the world; the most serious crimes 
must not go unpunished; effective prosecution must be ensured; 
and International Criminal Court jurisdiction shall complement 
national criminal jurisdiction.9 
Though created with the best intentions, the ICC is now 
 
the Genocide Convention) [hereinafter Overview of the Rome Statute]. 
 4 Id.; Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_ 
Statute_ glish.pdf [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 45 
(noting that achieving the goal of creating a permanent international criminal 
court "was slow and painstaking, but it was finally achieved"). 
 5 See, e.g., Letter from Kofi Annan, United Nations Sec‘y-Gen., to Professor 
M. Cherif Bassiouni (Aug. 31, 1998) (noting that "[t]he adoption of the Rome 
Statute of an International Criminal Court marks a giant step forward in the 
march towards universal human rights and the rule of law"). 
 6 Overview of the Rome Statute, supra note 3. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id.  The Overview further explains that since the International Court of 
Justice in The Hague handles only cases between States, not individuals, 
"individual responsibility as an enforcement mechanism, acts of genocide and 
egregious violations of human rights often go unpunished" in the absence of an 
international criminal court with a mandate to prosecute individuals.  Id. 
 9 Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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struggling to achieve and maintain legitimacy.  In light of the 
ICC‘s treatment of its case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
(―Lubanga‖),10 and in particular, the Tribunal‘s insistence upon 
upholding the principle of a defendant‘s right to a fair trial, the 
ICC has taken one step forward in establishing itself as a 
legitimate judicial institution.  As the case against Lubanga is the 
first case ever tried at the ICC, the ICC‘s treatment of the case 
will have significant implications on the future of the Tribunal 
and international criminal law. 
Part I of this note discusses the background of the case and 
introduces the competing provisions of the Rome Statute and the 
ICC‘s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which have given rise to 
the principal legal issue in the case against Lubanga.  Part I also 
analyzes the tension between competing provisions of the Rome 
Statute and the ICC‘s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  Article 
54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute allows the Office of the Prosecutor 
(―the Prosecutor‖) to gather documents and information on a 
confidential basis solely for the purpose of generating new 
evidence.11  This provision also forbids the Prosecutor from 
disclosing this evidence to the defendant without the consent of 
the information providers.12  This raises serious concerns for the 
 
 10 On March 3, 2004, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
was referred to the Prosecutor of the ICC and the Prosecutor's decision to open 
an investigation in the situation in the DRC was announced on June 23, 2006.  
Chronology of the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Case, INT‘L CRIM. CT. NEWSL. (Int‘l 
Criminal Court, The Hague), Nov. 2006, at 1 [hereinafter ICC Newsletter No. 
10], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B75835 FA-167E-4E9D-
BC37-06239D316DD4/146439/ICCNL10200611_En1.pdf.  On January 12, 2006, 
the Prosecutor submitted an application to the Chamber for the issuance of an 
arrest warrant for Lubanga.  Id.  On March 17, 2006, Lubanga was transferred 
to the ICC, where he has remained.  Id.  Nearly a year later, on January 29, 
2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed the charges against Lubanga. 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf.  The international community began to closely 
monitor the case against Lubanga, as it was set to be the "first trial before the 
International Criminal Court and the first time that an individual has been 
brought before an international court solely on the basis of these crimes."  Press 
Release, International Criminal Court, Child Soldier Charges in the First 
International Criminal Court Case (Aug. 28, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+ Prosecutor/-
Reports+and+Statements/Press+Releases/Press+Releases+2006. 
 11 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 54(3)(e). 
 12 Id. 
3
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legitimacy of the proceedings, as this provision makes it entirely 
possible for the Prosecutor to possess, yet refuse to disclose to the 
defense, potentially exculpatory information.  The Tribunal must 
strive to strike a proper balance between a defendant‘s right to a 
fair trial versus the reality of the Prosecutor‘s need to rely on 
information obtained on a confidential basis.  This article 
analyzes the Tribunal‘s treatment of the case against Lubanga 
and focuses on the Tribunal‘s first attempt at addressing these 
competing tensions. 
Part II of this note examines how other international courts, 
specifically the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the European Court of Human Rights have 
analyzed and decided similar legal issues (i.e., whether the 
discovery of potentially exculpatory information is a fundamental 
right and part of a defendant‘s right to a fair trial).  Finally, Part 
III of this note discusses the likely impact of the ICC‘s treatment 
of the case against Lubanga on the ICC.  Given that the case 
against Lubanga is the ICC‘s first case, it will undoubtedly have 
significant implications for the legitimacy of the ICC. 
I. THE ICC PREPARES FOR ITS FIRST TRIAL 
The ICC‘s Pre-Trial Chamber I determined, based on the 
evidence presented to the Tribunal for the purpose of the 
confirmation hearing that, there was: 
[S]ufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is responsible [for] enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of fifteen years into the FPLC13 
and using them to participate actively in hostilities within the 
meaning of Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 25(3)(a) of the [Rome] Statute 
from early September 2002 to 2 June 2003.14 
Shortly after the confirmation hearing, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
 
 13 FPLC is the acronym for the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du 
Congo, the armed military wing of the Union des Patriots Congolais ("UPC").  
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 10, at 6.  On September 15, 
2000, Lubanga was the first signatory of the statutes of the UPC and held a 
leadership position.  Id.  The UPC was renamed Union des Patriotes 
Congolais/Réconciliation et Paix (UPC/RP) in early September 2002, at which 
Lubanga becomes its President. Id. Lubanga also became the Commander-in-
Chief of the FPLC.  Id. 
 14 Id. at 156. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC,  made a statement at a Press 
Conference in which he emphatically stated that the case against 
Lubanga ―is the first case, not the last . . . [and Lubanga‘s] arrest 
is a step forward in realizing the Rome Statute vision - to end 
impunity and atrocities all over the world.‖15  Mr. Moreno-
Ocampo further emphasized the importance of this case to the 
international community in an ICC Newsletter by stating that 
―[t]he Lubanga case is of historic magnitude for the fight against 
impunity and accountability for the commission of these crimes 
against children.  This case will inevitably resonate far beyond 
the courtroom.‖16  The international community now continues to 
watch as the proceedings against Lubanga ensue. 
After four and one-half years since the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo was referred to the ICC, and 
after one and one-half years since Lubanga has been confined at 
an ICC detention facility, on June 13, 2008, the ICC‘s Trial 
Chamber I (―Trial Chamber‖) rendered a decision imposing a 
conditional stay on the proceedings (―decision imposing stay‖) 
concluding that ―the trial process has been ruptured to such a 
degree that it is now impossible to piece together the constituent 
elements of a fair trial.‖17  Shortly thereafter, the Trial Chamber 
ordered the release of Lubanga pending a decision from the 
Appeals Chamber (―decision on release‖).18  The Trial Chamber‘s 
decision nearly extinguished all hope of the ICC trying its first 
case on the merits. 
 
 15 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the Int‘l Criminal Court, 
Statement at Press Conference in Relation with the Surrender to the Court of 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, at 3 (Mar. 18, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int//rdonlyres/699D1671-4841-4AAC-BFF41F1BF3F9DFEC/143842/LMO_ 
20060318_En1.pdf. 
 16 ICC Newsletter No. 10, supra note 10, at 2. 
 17 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 
54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, 
Together with Certain other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 
2008, ¶¶ 93, 95 (Jun. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Decision imposing stay], available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc511249.PDF.  Instead of creating finality, 
the Court left Lubanga's fate, and its legitimacy, up in the air.  See id. (noting 
that "if the stay on the proceedings is lifted hereafter, at that stage [other issues 
not addressed in this decision] will be resolved"). 
 18 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶¶ 35-36 (July 2, 2008) [hereinafter Decision 
on release], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc522804.PDF. 
5
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On October 21, 2008, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the 
Trial Chamber‘s decision imposing a stay of the proceedings 
(―decision confirming stay‖).19  On the same day, however, the 
Appeals Chamber rendered an additional decision reversing the 
Trial Chamber‘s decision on the release of Lubanga (―decision 
reversing release‖)20 finding that the Trial Chamber used the 
incorrect analysis in ordering Lubanga‘s release.21  Specifically, 
the Appeals Chamber concluded that ―[i]f a Chamber imposes a 
conditional stay of the proceedings, the unconditional release of 
the accused person is not the ‗inevitable‘ consequence and ‗the 
only correct course‘ to take.‖22  The Appeals Chamber further 
determined that ―the Chamber will have to consider all relevant 
circumstances and base its decision on release or detention on the 
criteria in Articles 60 and 58(1) of the Statute.‖23  This action 
undermined the ICC‘s struggle to achieve legitimacy by staying 
the proceedings yet reversing the release of Lubanga. 
Principally at issue is a discovery dispute.  The Prosecutor 
received over 200 documents, that are potentially exculpatory or 
which are material to the defendant‘s preparation.24  Specifically, 
the Chamber was informed that ―there are ‗approximately‘ 95 
items of potentially exculpatory material and 112 items which are 
‗material to defence preparation.‘‖25  The Prosecutor refused to 
 
 19 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the 
Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled 
"Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials 
Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the 
Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain other Issues Raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008", at 3 (Oct. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Decision 
confirming stay], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578371.pdf. 
 20 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the 
Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled 
"Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo", at 3 (Oct. 21, 2008) 
[hereinafter Decision reversing release], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578365.pdf. 
 21 See id. ¶ 1. 
 22 Id. ¶ 1. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Decision imposing stay, supra note 17, ¶ 63. 
 25 Id.  The first 156 of the 207 documents at issue, were provided by the UN.  
Id.  Prosecutor divided the undisclosed evidence into two categories: "evidence 
which would not materially impact on the Chamber's determination of the guilt 
or innocence of the accused and evidence which had that potential."  Prosecutor 
v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Prosecution Submission on 
Undisclosed Documents Containing Potentially Exculpatory Information, ¶ 8 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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disclose the documents, relying on Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome 
Statute, which provides that: ―The Prosecutor may: . . . (e) Agree 
not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or 
information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of 
confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new 
evidence, unless the provider of the information consents.‖26  The 
Prosecutor further argued that not only could he refuse to disclose 
the documents, but that he is obligated to refuse disclosure unless 
the information provider has consented to the disclosure, 
pursuant to the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the 
International Criminal Court and the United Nations and Rule 
82(1) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (―ICC Rules‖).27  
Article 18(3) of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement provides 
that: 
 
The United Nations and the Prosecutor may agree that the 
 
(Mar. 28, 2008).  Evidence that the Prosecutor argued could not impact the 
Chamber's decision as to Lubanga's guilt or innocence consists of: "evidence 
which purported to establish that children voluntarily joined the UPC/FPLC or 
were sent by their parents; tu quoque evidence which purported to establish the 
use of child soldiers by the Lendu or other armed groups in Ituri; reported 
benevolent acts by Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; material relating to the political 
nature of the UPC/FPLC and its aim of pacifying Ituri or references to it as an 
'all-inclusive' organization; and information falling within the scope of Rule 77."  
Id. ¶ 15.  The evidence which the Prosecutor acknowledged could materially 
impact the Court's determination of Lubanga's guilt or innocence included: 
"evidence indicating that [Lubanga] suffered from a mental condition; that he 
was intoxicated thus impairing his capacity to control, or understand the 
unlawfulness of, his conduct; that he was under duress or compulsion; that he 
acted in self-defence; that he made efforts to demobilize child soldiers; that he 
had insufficient command over people who committed the crimes with which he 
is charged; that the UPC/FPLC was under the control of Uganda, Rwanda and 
other countries."  Id. ¶¶ 19-26.  Lubanga claimed that the description of the 
categories of undisclosed potentially exculpatory materials were in fact 
exculpatory and should be disclosed. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06, Defendant's Response to the "Prosecution's Submissions on 
Undisclosed Documents Containing Potentially Exculpatory Information," ¶¶ 
14-19 (Apr. 22, 2008). 
 26 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 54(3)(e). 
 27 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the United Nations, Jun. 7, 2004 [hereinafter Negotiated Relationship 
Agreement], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres /916FC6A2-7846-
4177-A5EA-5AA9B6D1E96C/0/ICCASP3Res1_English.pdf; International 
Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence [hereinafter ICC Rules], 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-
B3E8B115E886/140164/Rules_of_procedure_and_ Evidence_English.pdf. 
7
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United Nations provide documents or information to the 
Prosecutor on condition of confidentiality and solely for the 
purpose of generating new evidence and that such documents or 
information shall not be disclosed to other organs of the Court or 
to third parties, at any stage of the proceedings or thereafter, 
without the consent of the United Nations.28 
Rule 82 (1) of the ICC further provides that ―the Prosecutor 
may not subsequently introduce such material or information into 
evidence without the prior consent of the provider of the material 
or information and adequate prior disclosure to the accused.‖29 
The Prosecutor defended the confidentiality agreements 
arguing that without the assistance of the UN and the documents 
provided under the agreements, it would not have been able to 
bring the case against Lubanga.30  Moreover, the Prosecutor 
explained that the Office of the Prosecutor ―depends upon the co-
operation of information-providers who were working under very 
difficult conditions on the ground and who had made a deliberate 
decision that, in order to protect staff, their information must be 
confidential.‖31  The Prosecution further contended that, if the 
Tribunal refused to accept the realities for the UN and NGOs on 
the ground, the information providers would not provide evidence 
and that ―there was no other option available.‖32  If the Prosecutor 
disclosed information obtained on a confidential basis, the 
information providers would lose the confidence of the victims and 
witnesses who provide the information.  Also, in light of 
Lubanga‘s charge of recruiting and conscripting child soldiers, 
many of the victims and witnesses are vulnerable children 
terrified of what could happen to them once the defendant 
becomes aware of their identities.  If their confidence is lost, the 
information providers would not have any evidence to give to the 
Prosecutor and crimes could not be prosecuted. 
The Prosecutor‘s argument raises significant concerns about 
 
 28 Negotiated Relationship Agreement, supra note 27, art. 18. 
 29 ICC Rules, supra note 27, R. 82(1). 
 30 Decision imposing stay, supra note 17, ¶ 26 (citing Transcript of Hearing 
at 84, Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-52-ENG (Oct. 1, 2007)) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Oct. 1, 2007], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc354143.PDF). 
 31 Decision imposing stay, supra note 17, ¶ 26. 
 32 Id. at 12/44-13/44, citing to Transcript of Oct. 1, 2007, supra note 30, at 
86.  
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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the future of the ICC.  There are currently three other pending 
cases at the ICC regarding the Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (or ―DRC‖).33  If the information providers 
refuse to allow disclosure of the evidence in the case against 
Lubanga, it is likely that they would refuse to allow disclosure of 
the material provided under similar confidentiality agreements in 
the other cases.  Given this potential, a resolution to this 
discovery dispute is evermore important in order to prosecute 
cases of alleged war crimes committed in the DRC. 
Furthermore, if the Prosecution would not have been able to 
initiate an investigation in the DRC without the information 
provided by the UN under the confidentiality agreements,34 there 
would be significant implications for the ICC.  In particular, the 
inability to investigate and prosecute allegations of war crimes 
would undermine the purposes and goals of the ICC.35  Certainly, 
there could be neither an end to impunity nor any help to end 
conflict without effective investigations and prosecutions.  The 
ICC has and will continue to receive criticism until it in fact 
conducts a fair trial and renders a decision on the merits of a 
case.36 
While the Trial Chamber‘s decision could receive criticism, at 
the same time, it serves to provide the ICC some standing and 
 
 33 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06 (Apr. 28, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 (July 2, 2007). 
 34 See Decision imposing stay, supra note 17, ¶ 26 (arguing that it "would 
not have been able to initiate an investigation in the DRC without the 
information provided by the UN under the confidentiality agreements"). 
 35 See Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl. (stating that the most serious 
crimes must not go unpunished [and] effective prosecution must be ensured); see 
also Overview of the Rome Statute, supra note 3 (noting that the ICC was 
created with the aspirations of achieving justice for all, to end impunity, to help 
end conflicts, to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals, to take over when 
national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act, and to deter 
future war criminals). 
 36 See Decision imposing stay, supra note 17, ¶ 95 (admitting that the 
court's legitimacy could be called into question as a direct result of the Court not 
being in a position to reach a decision based on the merits of the case).  
Specifically, the Court stated that "[a]lthough the Chamber has no doubt that 
this stay of proceedings is necessary, it is nonetheless imposed with great 
reluctance . . .  [w]hen crimes, particularly of a grave nature, are alleged it is 
necessary for justice that, whenever possible, a final determination is made as to 
the guilt or innocence of the accused.  The judicial process is seriously 
undermined if a court is prevented from reaching a verdict on the charges 
brought against an individual."  Id. 
9
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legitimacy as a result of its insistence upon upholding the bedrock 
principle of a defendant‘s right to a fair trial.  In its decision, the 
Trial Chamber explained that ―[t]he disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence in the possession of the prosecution is a fundamental 
aspect of the accused‘s right to a fair trial.‖37  The Prosecution‘s 
reliance on Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute and its 
confidentiality agreements with the UN must not serve to 
circumvent the rights of a defendant.  The Appeals Chamber 
explains that ―the use of Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute must not 
lead to breaches of the obligations of the Prosecutor vis-à-vis the 
suspect or the accused person.‖38  The Prosecutor, under Article 
54(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, is obligated to ―[f]ully respect the 
rights of persons arising under [the] Statute.‖39  Furthermore, ―[a] 
fundamental right of the accused person in proceedings before the 
Court is the right to disclosure of ‗evidence in the Prosecutor‘s 
possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to 
show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the 
accused, or which may affect the credibility of [the] prosecution[‘s] 
evidence.‘‖40  By imposing a stay on the proceedings, the ICC is 
emphasizing the importance of a fair trial. 
The Appeals Chamber further emphasizes the importance of 
a fair trial by explaining that ―[w]here the breaches of the rights 
of the accused are such as to make it impossible for him/her to 
make his/her defence within the framework of his rights, no fair 
trial can take place and the proceedings can be stayed.‖41  The 
Appeals Chamber supports its position by quoting the English 
Court of Appeal in Huang v. Secretary of State, which held that: 
 
 37 Id. ¶ 92.  The Court further explained that "[t]he prosecution has 
incorrectly used Article 54(3)(e) when entering into agreements with 
information-providers, with the consequence that a significant body of 
exculpatory evidence which would otherwise have been disclosed to the accused 
is to be withheld from him, thereby improperly inhibiting the opportunities for 
the accused to prepare his defence; and [t]he Chamber has been prevented from 
exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 64(2), Article 64(3)(c) and Article 67(2), 
in that it is unable to determine whether or not the non-disclosure of this 
potentially exculpatory material constitutes a breach of the accused's right to a 
fair trial."  Id. 
 38 Decision confirming stay, supra note 19, ¶ 42. 
 39 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 54(1)(c). 
 40 Decision confirming stay, supra note 19, ¶ 42 (quoting Rome Statute, 
supra note 4, art. 67(2)). 
 41 Decision confirming stay, supra note 19, ¶ 78. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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It is the duty of a court: to see to the protection of individual 
fundamental rights which is the particular territory of the 
courts . . . .  Unfairness in the treatment of the suspect or the 
accused may rupture the process to an extent making it 
impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair 
trial.  In those circumstances, the interest of the world 
community to put persons accused of the most heinous crimes 
against humanity on trial, great as it is, is outweighed by the 
need to sustain the efficacy of the judicial process as the potent 
agent of justice.42 
The international community may claim that the ICC is 
valuing a defendant‘s rights over those of the victims‘.  However, 
while protecting victims and granting victims a voice in judicial 
proceedings are extremely important, they cannot be afforded at 
the expense of justice.  Indeed, justice is, in part, a transparent 
and fair judicial system.  At the heart of a transparent and fair 
judicial system is the right to a fair trial. 
Moreover, if the ICC ruled in favor of the Prosecutor, by 
allowing the Prosecutor to keep potentially exculpatory material 
from the defendant, the ICC would likely have lost any and all 
legitimacy it currently possesses, as justice cannot exist if the 
defendant is denied a fair trial.  The Prosecutor has a significant 
role in ensuring that a trial is fair.  One international law scholar 
has explained that: 
 
The international prosecutor is the representative of the 
international community. . . .  The mandate given to him by 
the international community does not encompass working 
towards the conviction of any suspect, rather he must be 
convinced that every other possible chronology of events can 
truly be excluded.  The prosecutor is obliged to the truth.  
Therefore he has to perform his duties in an objective 
manner.  This is understood to imply more than just the 
proper conduct of the inquiry.  Objectivity means that the 
prosecutor must actively seek for incriminating as well as 
exculpatory evidence.43 
Additionally, it is important to note that in most criminal 
 
 42 Id. ¶ 78. 
 43 CHRISTOPHER J.M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 367 (2001). 
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justice systems ―the end is not just to punish somebody for a 
crime that occurred, but to find the person who has actually 
committed the offense.  To punish by any means is therefore ruled 
out.‖44  This principle also serves to advance the ICC‘s purpose of 
ensuring effective prosecution.45  Accordingly, the Trial Chamber 
and the Appeals Chamber correctly concluded that, the defendant 
must receive all exculpatory material in order to receive a fair 
trial. 
The Trial Chamber‘s emphasis on a defendant‘s right to a fair 
trial is highlighted in its decision imposing the stay, serving to 
further legitimize its decision and its role as an impartial 
international criminal tribunal.  The Trial Chamber posed the 
question of whether the right to a fair trial includes the right to 
disclosure of potentially exculpatory material.46  It then 
―unhesitatingly concluded that the right to a fair trial – which is 
without doubt a fundamental right – includes an entitlement to 
disclosure of exculpatory material.‖47  It reasoned that the trial 
could not fairly go forward given the prosecution‘s inability to 
allow disclosure of potentially exculpatory documents.48  
Specifically, it noted that: 
 
[T]he Bench has been prevented from assessing for itself the 
impact on the fairness of [the documents in question] should 
the evidence remain undisclosed, and the approach of the 
prosecution means, inter alia, that for purposes of Article 
67(2), the Chamber could never, ‗in case of doubt,‘ make a 
decision (because it will be unable to view the underlying 
material).49 
Although the international community may have viewed the stay 
as an initial setback, it nonetheless cannot deny the underlying 
importance of the court‘s reasoning and analysis.50 
 
 44 Id. at 18-19. 
 45 See Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl. (noting that effective prosecution 
must be ensured). 
 46 Decision imposing stay, supra note 17, at 34. 
 47 Id. at 34. 
 48 Id. at 38. 
 49 Id. at 38-39. 
 50 See ICC: Congo Ruling Victory for Justice, HUMAN RIGHTTS. WATCH, Nov. 
18, 2008, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/11/18/icc-congo-ruling-
victory-justice.  Param-Preet Singh, counsel in Human Rights Watch's 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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In its decision confirming the stay, the Appeals Chamber 
provided further insight on a defendant‘s right to a fair trial, and 
further support for the proposition that the decisions add to the 
ICC‘s legitimacy.  The Appeals Chamber opined that ―[n]either 
the Rome Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
provides for a ‗stay of proceedings‘ before the Court.‖51  
Nonetheless, it follows from Article 21(3) of the Statute that: 
 
Where [a] fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of 
the fundamental rights of the suspect or the accused by 
his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put 
the person on trial.  Justice could not be done.  A fair trial is 
the only means to do justice.  If no fair trial can be held, the 
object of the judicial process is frustrated and must be 
stopped.52 
The Appeals Chamber further explained that ―[h]ad the Trial 
Chamber decided to go ahead with the trial, there would always 
have been lurking doubt as to whether the undisclosed material 
would have potentially changed anything for the outcome of the 
trial.‖53  Moreover, ―[k]nowledge of the existence of exonerating 
evidence not put before the Trial Chamber would cloud the 
proceedings with doubt, rendering them a priori inconclusive.‖54  
In light of the circumstances surrounding the case and the 
Prosecution‘s inability to turn over the potentially exculpatory 
documents, the ICC had no impartial choice but to impose a stay 
in order to maintain credibility.55  Accordingly, if the case against 
Lubanga proceeded to trial and the ICC rendered a decision 
finding Lubanga guilty of the charges, even though Lubanga had 
not received the potentially exculpatory documents, the 
 
International Justice Program, noted that ―[t]he judge's insistence on protecting 
the rights of the defendant also shows the ICC's commitment to fair trials."  Id. 
 51 Decision confirming stay, supra note 19, at 29. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Prosecutor Transcript of Hearing at 7, Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC 
01/04-01/06 (Oct. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Transcript of Oct. 21, 2008], available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578601.pdf. 
 54 Decision confirming stay, supra note 19, at 58. 
 55 See Transcript of Oct. 21, 2008, supra note 53, at 10-11(emphasis added) 
(noting that "[a] fair trial is the only means to do justice.  If no fair trial can be 
held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and the process must be 
stopped."). 
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legitimacy of the ICC would be severely undermined.56 
In order to protect its legitimacy, the ICC should not value 
expedience over rules of procedure established to ensure a fair 
trial.  Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, emphasized the 
importance of fair trials by stating: 
 
I reiterate what I said in my address at the opening of the 
Conference: The overriding interest must be that of the 
victims, and of the international community as a whole.  The 
court must be an instrument of justice, not expedience.  It 
must be able to protect the weak against the strong.  It must 
demonstrate that an international conscience is a reality.57 
Moreover, whether the ICC‘s first trial is considered ―fair‖ is 
imperative to foster the Tribunal‘s legitimacy.58 
The right to a fair trial also resonates in international law 
documents such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights59 and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.60  In fact, Article 67 of the Rome Statute, providing for 
―Rights of the accused,‖61 was modeled after Article 14(3) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is 
considered one of the principal human rights treaties.62  The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,63 the regional human 
 
 56 See Decision confirming stay, supra note 19, at 58 (noting that "[i]f the 
Trial Chamber was to embark upon the trial of the accused, this would be done 
with knowledge that the right of the accused to prepare his defence had been 
violated and that evidence supporting the accused's innocence was withheld with 
predictable consequences on the safety of the verdict of the court"). 
 57 Letter of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President of 
the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (July 7, 1998). 
 58 See Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: 
Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 114 (2002) (opining that "[i]f 
trials are unfair, or perceived to be unfair, international criminal courts – the 
two ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR and the ICC might quickly lose 
legitimacy"). 
 59 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec, 12, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 60 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 61 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 67. 
 62 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 206 (2007).  See also ICCPR, supra note 59. 
 63 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 60, arts. 10, 
11(3).  Article 10 provides that "[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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rights conventions,64 and humanitarian law instruments65 further 
protect and emphasize the right to a fair trial.  International law 
scholar and commentator William A. Schabas further explained 
that: 
 
The general right to a ‗fair hearing‘ established in the 
chapeau of Article 67 of the Statute provides defendants with 
a powerful tool to go beyond the text of a Statute, and to 
require that the Court‘s respect for the rights of an accused 
keep pace with the progressive development of human rights 
law.  Although Article 67 is placed with the provisions 
dealing with the trial itself, the right to a fair hearing applies 
at all stages of the proceedings, and even during the 
investigation, when no defendant has even been identified.66 
It is extremely unlikely that the international community, 
believing in the importance of the rule of law, would accept an 
institution that would allow unfair trials to proceed.  Moreover, 
the ICC, being a relatively new institution, would lose credibility 
and legitimacy.  Without legitimacy, the ICC‘s goals would 
become unattainable and the ICC would fail to fulfill its mission 
set forth in the Preamble to the Rome Statute.67 
 
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
him."  Id. art. 10.  Article 11(3) provides that "[e]veryone charged with a penal 
offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his 
defence."  Id. art. 11(3). 
 64 See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human 
Rights art. 8, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; European 
Convention on Human Rights art. 6, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 40, ¶ 2, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
 65 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
arts. 84-87 and 99-108, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War arts. 
5, 64-76, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6, Dec. 12, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 66 SCHABAS, supra note 62, at 207. 
 67 See ANTONIO CASSESE, 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 91 (2002) (explaining that "[t]he Rome Statute provides the 
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The ICC, however, undermines its own legitimacy by 
emphasizing the importance of a defendant‘s right to a fair trial, 
yet rendering its decision confirming a conditional stay and 
reversing the decision on Lubanga‘s release.  The Trial Chamber, 
in its decision on the release of Lubanga, determined that ―the 
inevitable result [of the stay] is that the Chamber must order the 
immediate release of the accused.‖68  The Appeals Chamber 
disagreed with the Trial Chamber‘s analysis and reversed the 
decision.69  The Appeals Chamber reasoned that ―[i]f a Chamber 
imposes a conditional stay of the proceedings, the unconditional 
release of the accused person is not the ‗inevitable‘ consequence or 
‗the only correct course‘ to take.  Instead the Chamber will have to 
consider all relevant circumstances and base its decision on 
release or detention on the criteria in Articles 60 and 58(1) of the 
Statute.‖70 
On remand, the Trial Chamber has been instructed to ―take 
into account that the trial has been conditionally stayed, not 
permanently terminated.  If the conditions for continued 
detention are not met, the Chamber will have to determine 
whether . . . release should be with or without conditions.‖71  
Specifically, the Trial Chamber must consider ―whether further 
developments since the imposition of the conditional stay make it 
likely that the stay might be lifted in the not-too-distant future.‖72  
It further explained that ―the Chamber must be vigilant that any 
continued detention would not be for an unreasonably long period 
of time, in breach of internationally recognised human rights73 . . . 
[and] [i]f a Chamber concludes that the continued detention, or 
 
framework for an extraordinary new institution, but ultimately the Court's 
vitality and living impact will depend on the dedication and ability of its staff 
and the political support it receives from States and from the world public . . . 
[w]ith support, it can help deter some of the worst crimes and help uphold 
stability and the rule of law"). 
 68 Decision on release, supra note 18, at 15. 
 69 Decision reversing release, supra note 20, at 3. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 15. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id., ICCPR, supra note 59, art. 9(3); Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5(3), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
2889 (protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe); American 
Convention on Human Rights art. 7(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 17955; 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7(1)(d), June 27, 1981, 21 
I.L.M. 58, 60. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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the release only with conditions, is justified, it will have to review 
such a decision at short intervals.‖74 
Judge Georghios M. Pikis of the Appeals Chamber, in a 
separate opinion, criticized the majority‘s rationale and decision.  
He explained that ―contemplating [the] stay being lifted at an 
unspecified future time contradicts the order of the stay itself, 
founded as it was on the impossibility of holding a fair trial and 
wholly ignores the timeliness of the proceedings as an element of 
a fair trial, not to mention its expeditiousness.‖75  Moreover, 
―[a]uthority to lift [the] stay would leave the accused answerable 
to charges for an indefinite period of time, theoretically in 
perpetuity, in breach of his right to be tried without undue delay; 
a right associated with certainty respecting his status and rights 
as a human being.‖76  In light of customary international law and 
agreements,77 the ICC‘s decision to allow further detention, while 
dismissing the appeal, will undoubtedly cast some doubt over the 
legitimacy of the ICC. 
Judge Pikis also pointed out the contradictory nature of the 
ICC‘s treatment of Lubanga.  Since the Trial Chamber found that 
it would be ―impossible‖78 to conduct a fair trial, Judge Pikis 
explained that ―[t]he likelihood of holding an expeditious trial 
after the stay of proceedings on grounds of impossibility of 
holding a fair trial cannot be envisioned.  It is a contradiction in 
terms.‖79  Furthermore, he comments on the treatment of 
Lubanga and notes that ―[i]t is hardly [a] humane treatment to 
 
 74 Decision reversing release, supra note 20, at 15. 
 75 Decision confirming stay, supra note 19, at 59. 
 76 Decision reversing release, supra note 20, at 23-24 (internal citation 
omitted). 
 77 See ICCPR, supra note 59, art. 9, which provides, in pertinent part, that 
"[a]nyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge . . . shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release."  Id. art. 9 (3).  Article 5 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, provides, in pertinent part, that "No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save . . . in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law  
. . . [and the accused] shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to 
release pending trial."  Id. art. 5(1)(c) and 5(3).  Article 7 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 17955, provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person detained . . . 
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without 
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings." Id. art. 7(5). 
 78 Decision on release, supra note 18, at 15. 
 79 Decision reversing release, supra note 20, at 24-25 (emphasis added). 
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expect the accused to live under the burden of accusation for an 
indefinite or uncertain period of time, while prevented from 
asserting his innocence before a court of law.‖80  Allegations of 
contradictory and inhumane treatment by a sitting Judge on the 
Appeals Chamber certainly do not evince an efficient and 
legitimate Tribunal.  Despite this criticism, the ICC will not lose 
all legitimacy, given its insistence upon upholding the bedrock 
principle of the right to a fair trial. 
While considering the rights of the accused, the Tribunal 
must also consider the rights of the victims and community 
members.  Victims of the atrocities committed in the DRC oppose 
the release of Lubanga, arguing that if Lubanga is released 
without ever being tried, ―the sense of the people of the country 
that the perpetrators of grave crimes . . . will be undermined or 
destroyed; sequentially it will cultivate a sense of impunity on the 
part of the perpetrators of grave crimes.‖81  One of the victims‘ 
advocates added that if the ICC releases Lubanga, ―the victim[s] 
will experience remorse or regret for coming to the Court, a step 
reduced to inconsequentiality.‖82  More importantly, the ICC must 
be aware of the witnesses‘ and victims‘ safety.83  Furthermore, in 
light of the current state of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and the lack of respect for the rule of law, it is unlikely that the 
alleged war criminals could be ensured a fair trial there.84 
 
 80 Id. at 25. 
 81 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/06, "Observations on 
the Prosecutor's appeal against the Decision of 2 July 2008 ordering the release 
of the accused" ¶ 7 (Aug. 12, 2008); Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC 
01/04-01/06, Observations of the Legal Representative of Victim a/0105/06 
Regarding the Release of Lubanga Dyilo ¶ 17 (Aug. 12, 2008). 
 82 Id. ¶ 18. 
 83 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/06, Decision on 
the prosecution and defence applications for leave to appeal the Trial Chamber's 
"Decision on Disclosure Issues, Responsibilities for Protective Measures and 
other Procedural Matters" (Dec. 16, 2008).  In denying the defendant's 
contention on the prosecution's disclosure obligation, the Trial Chamber I noted 
that "[i]t is to be observed that the protection of individuals or organizations lay 
at the heart of the agreements reached under [Article 54]."  Id. 
 84 Mary Will, Note, A Balancing Act: The Introduction of Restorative Justice 
in the International Courts, 17 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 85, 101 (2007).  
Congolese justice system not equipped to handle international crimes with so 
many victims.  This is precisely why "the Congolese victims put their hope in the 
International Criminal Court."  Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Confirmation of charges Hearing, at 76 (Nov. 9, 
2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc216086. PDF). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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Justice for victims is extremely important and the ICC must 
be sensitive not only to the submissions of the participating 
victims but to the people remaining in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo who are subject to the atrocities being committed in 
their country.  Nonetheless, ―[h]uman rights . . . aim to sustain 
the core of humanity and the right to a fair trial is amongst the 
most consequential ones.  Laxity in their protection beholds, as 
history teaches, great dangers for humanity, such that no court of 
law should countenance.‖85  In light of the importance of the right 
to a fair trial and the fact that the ICC upheld this standard, the 
ICC is moving closer to achieving legitimacy. 
 
 
II. EXAMINATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS‘ INTERPRETATIONS OF SIMILAR LEGAL ISSUES 
In its reasoning for imposing the stay, the Tribunal 
―unhesitatingly concluded that the right to a fair trial – which is 
without doubt a fundamental right – includes an entitlement to 
disclosure of exculpatory material.‖86  To support this conclusion, 
the Court looked to Article 67(2) of the Rome Statute as well as 
relevant international jurisdiction.87  In particular, the Court 
reviewed jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(―ECtHR‖) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (―ICTY‖).88  The Tribunal also specifically noted 
relevant portions of the ICTY‘s reasoning in the cases of The 
Prosecutor v. Krstic,89 The Prosecutor v. Oric,90 and The Prosecutor 
 
 85 Decision reversing release, supra note 20, at 15. 
 86 Decision imposing stay, supra note 17, at 34. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. (citing V. v. Finland,  App. No. 40412/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74 (2007)), 
available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.aspaction=html&documentId=815825&po
rtal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C11
66DEA398649, in which the European Court of Human Rights stated that "both 
[the] prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge 
of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other 
party . . . prosecution authorities [must] disclose to the defence all material 
evidence in their possession for or against the accused"). 
 89 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 180 
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v. Brdanin and Talic91 to support its conclusion that Lubanga 
would be denied his right to a fair trial without the disclosure of 
potentially exculpatory material.92  The Tribunal also drew its 
rationale from the ECtHR citing the cases of Rowe & Davis v. 
U.K.93 and Jasper v. U.K.94  The Tribunal determined that, in 
light of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the ICTY, it must 
impose a stay of the proceedings until such time as would render 
it possible to hold a fair trial (i.e., when the prosecution would 
agree to turn over the potentially exculpatory documents in 
question). 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Krstic stated that ―[t]he 
disclosure of exculpatory material is fundamental to the fairness 
of proceedings before the Tribunal and considerations of fairness 
are the overriding factor in any determination of whether the 
governing Rule has been breached.‖95  In Oric, the Trial Chamber 
noted that ―[t]he jurisprudence of the Tribunal is clear that, in 
pursuit of justice, the disclosure of [exculpatory] Material to the 
Defence is of paramount importance to ensure the fairness of 
proceedings before [the] Tribunal.‖96  The Trial Chamber also 
 
(Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-
aj040419e.pdf). 
 90 Id. at 35 (citing Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Decision on 
ongoing complaints about prosecutorial non-compliance with Rule 68 of the 
Rules, ¶ 20 (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/ tdec/en/ 
051213.htm). 
 91 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Public 
Version of the Confidential Decision on the Alleged Illegality of Rule 70 of 6 May 
2002, ¶ 19 (May 23, 2002), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ 
brdanin/tdec/en/020523.pdf). 
 92 See Decision imposing stay, supra note 17, at 34-35. 
 93 Id. at 36-37 (citing Rowe & Davis v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28901/95, 
Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, ¶ 66 (Feb. 16, 2000), available at http:// 
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highli
ght=ROWE&sessionid=37977910&skin=hudoc-en). 
 94 Id. at 37 (citing Jasper v. U.K., App. No 27052/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., 
Judgment, ¶ 56 (Feb. 16, 2000), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=27052/95&sessi
onid=37978501&skin=hudoc-en). 
 95 Id. at 34 (citing Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 
180 (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/ en/krs-
aj040419e.pdf). 
 96 Id. at 34-35 (citing Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Decision on 
ongoing complaints about prosecutorial non-compliance with Rule 68 of the 
Rules, ¶ 20 (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/ 
tdec/en/051213.htm). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/6
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emphasized in Talic that, although it may be ―necessary in some 
cases to withhold certain material from the defence, so as to 
safeguard an important public interest,‖ nonetheless ―the public 
interest . . . is excluded where its application would deny to the 
accused the opportunity to establish his or her innocence.‖97  In 
light of the ICTY‘s reasoned decisions and the disclosure issues at 
bar, the ICC made a logical decision upholding established 
principles of fairness, by imposing the stay. 
Similarly, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR provided further 
support for the ICC‘s decision imposing the stay.  The Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR in Rowe & Davis v. United Kingdom98 
noted that the right to disclosure is not an absolute right.99 
Nonetheless, it emphasized that ―[a] procedure, whereby the 
prosecution itself attempts to assess the importance of concealed 
information to the defence and weigh[s] this against the public 
interest in keeping the information secret, cannot comply with the 
above-mentioned requirements of Article 6 § 1 [right to a fair 
trial].‖100  This approach and emphasis on a defendant‘s right to a 
fair trial has been confirmed in several subsequent decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights.101  Moreover, 
demonstrating the need for judicial control over discovery 
disputes, the ECtHR noted in Jasper v. United Kingdom that 
―[t]he fact that the need for disclosure was at all times under 
assessment by the trial judge provided a further, important, 
safeguard in that it was his duty to monitor throughout the trial 
the fairness or otherwise of the evidence being withheld.‖102  The 
ICC‘s decision imposing a stay of proceedings pending resolution 
of the discovery disputes was made in accordance with the wise 
reasoning set forth in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
 
 97 Id. at 35 (citing Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, 
Public Version of the Confidential Decision on the Alleged Illegality of Rule 70 of 
6 May 2002, ¶ 19 (May 23, 2002), available at http://www.icty.org/ 
x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/020523.pdf). 
 98 Rowe & Davis v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28901/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., 
Judgment, ¶ 66 (Feb. 16, 2000). 
 99 Id. ¶ 61. 
 100 Id. ¶ 63. 
 101 See Condron v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35718/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 
65 (2001); Atlan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36533/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33, 38 
(2002); Dowsett v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39482/98, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41, 44 
(2004); V. v. Finland, ¶ 78. 
 102 Jasper, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep., ¶ 56. 
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The ICC is progressing toward achieving legitimacy by 
supporting its decision to impose the stay of proceedings with 
established jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the ICTY, along with 
a permanent court and an ad hoc war crimes tribunal.  To the 
contrast, the Tribunal would be taking a step backward if it 
completely disregarded established, well-reasoned jurisprudence. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION LIFTING THE STAY 
On remand before the Trial Chamber I, nearly one month 
after the decision by the Appeals Chamber staying the 
proceedings, the Trial Chamber I determined that since the 
Prosecution was able to come to an agreement with the UN and 
the information gatherers, ―the reasons for imposing the stay and 
thereafter for retaining it have fallen away,‖103 and subsequently 
set a trial date for the ICC‘s first case to commence.104  The 
Tribunal further explained that it had ―originally imposed the 
stay of proceedings because the Chamber was not to be permitted 
to assess for itself the impact of the fairness of these proceedings 
if evidence was to remain undisclosed.‖105 
In light of the fact that Lubanga‘s trial is the first trial before 
the ICC, the proceedings will undoubtedly have significant 
implications on the future of the Tribunal.  First, human rights 
workers have noted that ―[t]he work of the ICC is important 
because it sends the signal that [unaccounted-for war crimes are] 
coming to an end.‖106  Second, ―so long as government rewards 
warlords and doesn‘t punish them then impunity will 
continue.‖107 
It is also important to note that this trial may have an impact 
on the way war crimes are viewed, both by the international 
community seeking the promotion of human rights and 
 
 103 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Status 
Conference Transcript, at 3 (Nov. 18, 2008), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc586028.pdf [hereinafter Transcript of November 18, 2008, 
hearing]. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 2. 
 106 See Karen Allen, Congo Trial Starts Road to Justice, BBC NEWS, Jan. 25, 
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7850357.stm. 
 107 Id. 
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accountability and by alleged war crimes violators.108  The 
commencement of trial, after the disclosure obligations have been 
met, is certainly a step in the right direction toward achieving the 
goals set forth in the Preamble to the Rome Statute.109 
The creation and efficient functioning of a new institution 
must begin somewhere.  A fair trial of Thomas Lubanga is an 
essential step in attaining an effective and legitimate ICC.  One 
commentator has noted that ―[a]lthough the [Lubanga] case is 
relatively minor, focusing only on two counts of war crimes, it was 
a ‗Tadić case‘ with which the ICC could demonstrate how it would 
begin discharging its judicial functions.‖110  The Tadić case was 
the first proceeding before the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia and ―was a case against a relatively 
‗small‘ accused that should have probably never been tried before 
an international tribunal . . . .‖111  Nonetheless, it has been noted 
that the Tadić trial ―turned out to be the ideal test for an 
international judicial institution to prove that it could function 
effectively, dispensing fair and effective justice for international 
crimes.‖112  Similarly, the Lubanga trial could be the ideal test for 
the ICC to prove its legitimacy.  Indeed, the ICC has already 
proved that it is committed to ensuring a defendant‘s right to a 
fair trial by imposing a stay after determining that potential 
exculpatory documents were not disclosed.113 
While in this initial trial, the Tribunal has insisted upon 
upholding a defendant‘s right to a fair trial, it must maintain this 
bedrock principle in subsequent cases.  ―In a discussion of 
legitimacy and international institutions Julian Ku has drawn 
from Robert Dahl‘s formulation that a government is said to be 
‗legitimate‘ if the people of government possess the quality of 
‗rightness,‘ propriety, or moral goodness — the right, in short, to 
 
 108 See id. (noting that children's charities "warn that the trial could have 
far-reaching implications for the use of child soldiers worldwide" and that "the 
Lubanga trial is crucial"). 
 109 See Samantha Power, The ICC Can Serve the U.S., WALL ST. J. (Europe), 
July 11, 2002, at A10. 
 110 Salvatore Zappalá, Lubanga Before the ICC, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 467, 
468 (2008). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 469 n.3. 
 113 See generally Decision imposing stay, supra note 17; see also Decision 
confirming stay, supra note 19. 
23
  
236 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  22:1 
make binding rules.‖114  Furthermore, ―the question of the 
legitimacy of a rule or a system cannot be kept wholly distinct 
from the fairness of its substantive content.‖115  If the ICC cannot 
make binding rules, such as upholding the right to a fair trial 
under Rule 67, the Tribunal will likely be seen as a weak and 
arbitrary political body and will quickly lose its legitimacy. 
World opinion, including the opinions of victims, is essential 
for legitimacy.  If victims of war crimes do not feel as if the 
Tribunal is working in the interest of justice, the Tribunal cannot 
attain legitimacy.  The commencement of the trial against 
Lubanga serves to further legitimize the Tribunal in the eyes of 
the victims in the DRC.116  The Council for Human Rights 
Watch‘s International Justice Program commented that the 
decision lifting the stay ―assures that victims will have the chance 
to see Lubanga face justice . . . .‖117  The Council further explained 
that ―[t]he suspension of the trial caused significant confusion and 
disappointment among affected communities . . .‖118 where those 
in support and in opposition of Lubanga awaited a trial on 
charges of conscripting and enlisting child soldiers.119  Moreover, 
in order for a community to perceive the ICC as legitimate, ―[i]t is 
vital for affected communities to have accurate information on 
developments in the case‖120 and ―[i]f the court is serious about 
making justice meaningful to those most affected, it needs to find 
effective ways of reaching them and explaining what happened 
and why.‖121  In light of the lifting of the stay, victims and 
members of the Democratic Republic of the Congo‘s community 
may finally be one step closer to witnessing justice.122 
 
 114 Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial 
Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 
583, 653 n.213 (2007). 
 115 Id. at 673 n.214. 
 116 See Decision imposing stay, supra note 17, at 42.  The judges admitted 
that by staying the proceedings "the victims [had] . . . been excluded from 
justice."  Id. 
 117 ICC: Congo Ruling Victory for Justice, supra note 48. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. (explaining that "Lubanga's supporters in Ituri have also sought to 
use the suspension as proof of Lubanga's innocence"). 
 120 Id. 
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 122 See Interview by Jeremy Paxman of the BBC with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
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To the contrary, if the trial against Lubanga would not have 
proceeded, the Tribunal‘s legitimacy in the eyes of the victims and 
members of the community would have been severely 
undermined.123  One of the Victim‘s Advocates described the 
terrible state of the war-torn Ituri region while arguing before the 
ICC that Lubanga should not be released pending the 
commencement of the trial.124  The Victim‘s Advocate further 
explained that ―new armed groups have sprung to light, and they 
are sowing death and distress.  Such a release [of Lubanga] would 
only encourage them, and it would emphasise not only impunity, 
it would also emphasise that if proceedings are blocked, then it 
would encourage impunity.‖125  In light of the commencement of 
Lubanga‘s trial, a message has been sent to Congolese warlords 
that the ICC is now in a position to prosecute war crimes in the 
DRC and, furthermore, that violators will be held accountable for 
their crimes. 
The ICC, and in particular the Office of the Prosecutor, has 
been criticized for delays during pre-trial proceedings and the cost 
of putting one single defendant on trial.126  In an interview with 
the BBC, the ICC‘s Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
articulated his view of the significance of the Lubanga trial.127  In 
particular, he explained that the international community should 
not be focusing on the number of trials that the ICC has held.  
 
Interview], available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/ 
newsnight/7853594.stm. When asked the significance of the trial, the Chief 
Prosecutor explained that for the "people of Ituri it makes an absolute 
difference.‖ Id. 
 123 See LUBANGA TRIAL: A LANDMARK CASE, OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
available at http://lubangatrial.org (noting that "[c]hildren‘s organizations and 
human rights activists welcomed the arraignment of Lubanga as a step toward 
the protection of children‘s rights and a first step towards ending impunity"). 
 124 See Transcript of November 18, 2008, hearing, supra note 103 (opining 
that ―the security situation on the ground in Ituri is a problem today . . . . We 
think that it is not appropriate at this time to [release Lubanga] because the 
situation on the ground does not allow for this.‖). 
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 126 See Transcript of November 18, 2008, hearing, supra note 103, at 34 
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 127 Moreno-Ocampo, Interview, supra note 122.  See also Lubanga Trial: A 
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killers jeopardizes the future of mankind.‖  Id. 
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Rather, it is more important to focus on future implications.128  
Mr. Moreno-Ocampo explained that the Tribunal is in the process 
of creating international criminal jurisprudence and, as such, the 
measurement of achievement is ―not the number of trials in the 
court, it‘s the impact of the trial on the world.‖129  Responding to 
criticism regarding the Tribunal‘s budget, he further explained 
that if ―one trial in The Hague [could change] how armies around 
the world work . . . that is cost efficiency[—] . . . one trial, [with a] 
global impact . . . .‖130  He also emphasized the importance of the 
Tribunal‘s work by explaining that ―we are [in] a new era [of] . . . 
ending impunity . . . .‖131  Moreover, accountability for alleged war 
crimes, justice for victims and national reconciliation, along with 
other aspirations for the ICC, cannot be measured in terms of 
monetary value. 
CONCLUSION 
After the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued 
the first-ever genocide conviction by an international tribunal, 
former U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, expressed his desire 
for effective and legitimate war crimes tribunals.  He stated, ―[f]or 
there can be no healing without peace; there can be no peace 
without justice; and there can be no justice without respect for 
human rights and rule of law.‖132  It is certainly the hope of the 
international community that the ICC will attain legitimacy and 
in turn provide justice with respect for human rights and the rule 
of law. 
The creation of the ICC took many years and, now that it is 
in existence, some expect immediate results, including fair trials 
and prosecutions.  While the ICC‘s first case was caught in pre-
trial procedures and disputes for over four and one-half years, the 
ICC nonetheless determined that it must value the right of a fair 
trial over expediency.  The ICC‘s treatment of this case illustrates 
that while the functioning of an impartial judicial institution will 
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take time, a fair and legitimate proceeding is indeed possible.  A 
fair trial of Thomas Lubanga is an essential step in attaining an 
effective and legitimate ICC.  In light of the ICC‘s treatment of 
the case against Thomas Lubanga, the ICC has taken a step in 
the proper direction to demonstrate to the international 
community that it is a legitimate judicial institution. 
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